The problem of analyzing the effect of privacy concerns on the behavior of selfish utilitymaximizing agents has received much attention lately. Privacy concerns are often modeled by altering the utility functions of agents to consider also their privacy loss [Xia13, GR11, NOS12, CCK
Introduction
In recent years, as the subject of privacy becomes an increasing concern, many works have discussed the potential privacy concerns of economic utility-maximizing agents. Obviously, utility-maximizing agents are worried about the effect of revealing personal information in the current game on future transactions, and wish to minimize potential future losses. In addition, some agents may simply care about what some outside observer, who takes no part in the current game, believes about them. Such agents would like to optimize the effect of their behavior in the current game on the beliefs of that outside observer. Yet specifying the exact way in which information might affect the agents' future payment or an outside observer's beliefs is a complicated and intricate task.
Differential privacy (DP), a mathematical model for privacy, developed for statistical data analysis [DMNS06, DKM + 06], avoids the need for such intricate modeling by providing a worst-case bound on an agents' exposure to privacy-loss. Specifically, by using a -differentially private mechanism, agents can guarantee that the belief of any observer about them changes by no more than a multiplicative factor of e ≈ 1 + once this observer sees the outcome of the mechanism [Dwo06] . Furthermore, as pointed out in [GR11, NOS12] , using a -differentially private mechanism the agents guarantee that, in expectation, any future loss increases by no more than a factor of e −1 ≈ . A recent line of work [Xia13, GR11, NOS12, CCK + 13] has used ideas from differential privacy to model and analyze the behavior of privacy-awareness in game-theoretic settings. The aforementioned features of DP allow these works to bypass the need to model future transactions. Instead, they model privacy aware agents as selfish agents with utility functions that are "hardwired" to trade off between two components: a (positive) reward from the outcome of the mechanism vs a (negative) loss from their non-private exposure. This loss can be upper-bounded using DP, and hence in some cases can be shown to be dominated by the reward (of carefully designed mechanisms), showing that privacy concerns don't affect an agent's behavior.
However, in other cases, the behavior of privacy-aware agents may differ drastically from the behavior of classical, non-privacy aware agents. For example, consider a toy-game in which B tells A which of the two free gifts that A offers (or coupons as we call it, for reasons to be explained later) B would like to receive. We characterize B using one of two types, 0 or 1; where type 0 prefers the first gift and type 1 prefers the second one. (This is a rephrasing of the "Rye or Wholewheat" game discussed in [NOS12] .) Therefore it is simple to see that a non-privacy-aware agent always (deterministically) asks for the gift that matches her type. In contrast, if we model the privacy loss of a privacy-aware agent using DP as in the work of Ghosh and Roth [GR11] (and the value of the coupon is large enough), a privacy-aware agent takes a randomized strategy. (See Section 2.2.1.) Specifically, the agent plays Randomized Response, a standard differentially private mechanism that outputs a random choice slightly biased towards the agent's favorable action.
However, it was argued [NOS12, CCK + 13] that it is not realistic to use the worst-case model of DP to quantify the agent's privacy loss and predict her behavior. Differential privacy should only serve as an upper bound on the privacy loss, whereas the agent's expected privacy loss can (and should in fact) be much smaller -depending on the agent's predictions regarding future events, adversary's prior belief about her, the types and strategies of other agents, and the random choices of the mechanism and of other agents. As discussed above, these can be hard to model, so it is tempting to use a worst-case model like differential privacy.
But what happens if we can formulate the agent's future transactions? What if we know that the agent is concerned with the belief of a specific adversary, and we can quantify the effects of changes to that belief? Is the behavior of a classical selfish agent in that case well-modeled by such a "DP-hardwired" privacy-aware agent? Will she even randomize her strategy? In other words, we ask:
What is the behavior of a selfish utility-maximizing agent in a setting with clear privacy costs?
More specifically, we ask whether we can take the above-mentioned toy-game and alter it by introducing payments between A and B such that the behavior of a privacy-aware agent in the toy-game matches the behavior of classical (non-privacy aware) agent in the altered game. In particular, in case B takes a randomized strategy -does her behavior preserve -differential privacy, and for what value of ? The study of these questions may also provide insights relevant for traditional, non-game-theoretic uses of differential privacy -helping us understand how tightly differential privacy addresses the concerns of data subjects, and thus providing guidance in the setting of the privacy parameter or the use of alternative, non-worst-case variants of differential privacy (such as [BGKS13] ).
Our model. In this work we consider multiple games that model an interaction between an agent which has a secret type and an adversary whose goal is to discover this type. Though the games vary in the resulting behavior of the agents, they all follow a common outline which is similar to the toy game mentioned above. Agent A offers B a free coupon, that comes in one of two types {0, 1}. Agent B has a secret type t ∈ {0, 1} chosen from a known prior (D 0 , D 1 ), such that a type-t agent has positive utility ρ t for type-t coupon and zero utility for a type-(1 − t) coupon. And so the game starts with B sending A a signalt indicating the requested type of coupon. (Formally, B's utility for the coupon is ρ t 1 [t=t] for some parameters ρ 0 , ρ 1 .) Following this interaction, agent C, who viewed the signalt that B sent, challenges B into a game -with C taking actiont and incurring a payment from B of P (t, t). To avoid the need to introduce a third party into the game, we identify C with A. 1 Figure 1 gives a schematic representation of the game's outline.
We make a few observations of the above interaction. We aim to model a scenario where B has the most incentive to hide her true type whereas A has the most incentive to discover B's type. Therefore, all of the payments we consider have the property that if B's type is t * then t * = arg maxt P (t, t * ). Furthermore, the game is modeled so that the payments are transferred from B to A, which makes A's and B's goals as opposite as possible. (In fact, past the stage where B sends a signalt, we have that A and B plays a zero-sum game.) We also note that A and B play a Bayesian game (in extensive form) as A doesn't know the private type of B, only its prior distribution. We characterize Bayesian Nash Equilibria (BNE) in this paper and will show that in each game, the BNE is unique except when parameters of the game satisfy certain equality constraints. It is not difficult to show that the strategies at every BNE of our games are part of a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE), i.e. a subgame-perfect refinement of the BNE. However, we focus on BNE in this paper as the equilibrium refinement doesn't bring any additional insight to our problem.
Our results and paper organization. First, in Section 2, following preliminaries we discuss the DP-hardwired privacy-aware agent as defined by Ghosh and Roth [GR11] and analyze her behavior in our toy game. Our analysis shows that given sufficiently large coupon valuations ρ t , Figure 1 : A schematic view of the privacy game we model. both types of B agent indeed play Randomized Response. We also discuss conditions under which other models of DP-hardwired privacy-aware agents play a randomized strategy.
Following preliminaries, we consider three different games. These games follow the general coupon-game outline, yet they vary in their payment function. The discussion for each of the games follows a similar outline. We introduce the game, then analyze the two agents' BNE strategies and see if the strategy of the B agent is indeed randomized or pure (and in case it is randomizedwhether or not it follows Randomized Response for some value of ). We also compare the coupon game to a "benchmark game" where B takes no action and A guesses B's type without any signal from B. Investigating whether it is even worth while for A to offer such a coupon, we compare A's profit between the two games. 2 The payment functions we consider are the following.
1. In Section 3 we consider the case where the payment function is given by a proper scoring rule.
Proper scoring rules allows us to quantify the B's cost to any change in A's belief about her type. We show that in the case of symmetric scoring rules (scoring rules that are invariant to relabeling of event outcomes) both types of B agent follow a randomized strategy that causes A's posterior belief on the types to resemble Randomized Response. That is, initially A's belief on B being of type-0 (resp. type-1) is D 0 (resp. D 1 ); but B plays in a way such that after viewing thet = 0 signal, A's belief that B is of type-0 (resp. type-1) is 1+ 2 (resp.
1−
2 ) for some value of (and vice-versa in the case of thet = 1 signal with the same ).
2. In Section 4 we consider the case where the payments between A and B are the result of A guessing correctly B's type. A views the signalt and then guesses a typet ∈ {0, 1} and receives a payment of 1 [t=t] from B. This payment models the following viewpoint of B's future losses: there is a constant gap (of one "unit of utility") between interacting with an agent that knows B's type to an agent that does not know her type. We show that in this case, if the coupon valuations are fixed as ρ 0 and ρ 1 , then at least one type of B agent plays deterministically. However, if B's valuation for the coupon is sampled from a continuous distribution, then A's strategy effectively dictates a threshold with the following property: any B agent whose valuation for the coupon is below the threshold lies and signalst = 1 − t, and any agent whose valuation is above the threshold signals truthfullyt = t. Hence, an A agent who does not know B's valuation thinks of B as following a randomized strategy.
3. In Section 5 we consider a variation of the previous game where A also has the option to opt out and not challenge B into a payment game -to report ⊥ and in return get no payment (i.e., P (⊥, t) = 0). We show that in such a game, under a very specific setting of parameters, the only BNE is such where both types of B agent take a randomized strategy.
Under alternative settings of the game's parameters, the strategy of B is such that at least one of the two types plays deterministically.
Conclusions and future directions appear in Section 6, where we provide a discussion of our results. We find it surprising to see how minor changes to the privacy payments lead to diametrically different behaviors. In particular, we see the existence of a threshold phenomena. Under certain parameter settings in the game we consider in item 3 above, we have that if the value of the coupon is above a certain threshold then at least one of the two types of B agent plays deterministically; and if the value of the coupon is below this threshold, B randomizes her behavior s.t.t = t w.p. close to 1 2 .
Related Work
The study of the intersection between mechanism design and differential privacy began with the seminal work of McSherry and Talwar [MT07] , who showed that an -differentially private mechanism is also -truthful. The first attempt at defining a privacy-aware agent was of Ghosh and Roth [GR11] who quantified the privacy loss using a linear approximation v i · where v i is an individual parameter and is the level of differential privacy that a mechanism preserves. Other applications of differentially privacy mechanisms in game theoretic settings were studied by Nissim et al [NST12] . The work of Xiao [Xia13] initiated the study of mechanisms that are truthful even when you incorporate the privacy loss into the agents' utility functions. Xiao's original privacy loss measure was the mutual information between the mechanism's output and the agent's type. Nissim et al [NOS12] (who effectively proposed a preliminary version of our coupon game called "Rye or Wholewheat") generalized the models of privacy loss to only assume that it is upper bounded by
] proposed a refinement where the privacy loss is measured with respect to the given input and output. Fleischer and Lyu [FL12] considered the original model of agents as in Ghosh and Roth [GR11] but under the assumption that v i , the value of the privacy parameter of each agent, is sampled from a known distribution. Several papers in economics look at the potential loss of agents from having their personal data revealed. In fact, one folklore objection to the Vickrey auction is that in a repeated setting, by providing the sellers with the bidders' true valuations for the item, the bidders subject themselves to future loss should the seller prefer to run a reserved-price mechanism in the future. In the context of repeated interaction between an agent and a company, there have been works [CTW12, BBM13] studying the effect of price differentiation based on an agent allowing the company to remember whether she purchased the same item in the past. Interestingly, strategic agents realize this effect and so they might "haggle" -reject a price below their valuation for the item in round 1 so that they'd be able to get even lower price in round 2. In that sense, the fact that the agents publish their past interaction with the company actually helps the agents. Other work [CP06] discusses a setting where a buyer sequentially interacts with two different sellers, and characterizes the conditions under which the first seller prefers not to give the buyer's information to the second seller. Concurrently with our work, Gradwohl and Smorodinsky [GS14] , whose motivation is to analyze the effect of privacy concerns, introduce a framework of games in which an agent's utility is affected by both her actions and how her actions are perceived by a third party.
The privacy games that we propose and analyze in this paper fall into the class of signaling games [MCWG95] , where a sender (B in our game) with a private type sends a message (i.e. a signal) to a receiver (A in our game) who then takes an action. The payoffs of both players depend on the sender's message, the receiver's action, and the sender's type. Signaling games have been widely used in modeling behavior in economics and biology. The focus is typically on understanding when signaling is informative, i.e. when the message of the sender allows the receiver to infer the sender's private type with certainty, especially in settings when signaling is costly (e.g. Spence's job market signaling game [Spe73] ). In our setting, however, informative signaling violates privacy. We are interested in characterizing when the sender plays in a way such that the receiver cannot infer her type deterministically.
Preliminaries

Equilibrium Concept
We model the games between A and B as Bayesian extensive-form games. However, instead of using the standard Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE), which is a refinement of Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) for extensive-form games, as our solution concept, we analyze BNE for our games. It can be shown that all of the BNEs considered in our paper can be "extended" to PBEs (by appropriately defining the beliefs of agent A about agent B at all points in the game). We thus avoid defining the more subtle concept of PBE as the refinement doesn't provide additional insights for our problem. Below we define BNE.
A Bayesian game between two agents A and B is specified by their type spaces (Γ A , Γ B ), a prior distribution Π over the type spaces (according to which nature draws the private types of the agents), sets of available actions (C A , C B ), and utility functions,
A mixed or randomized strategy of agent i maps a type of agent i to a distribution over her available actions, i.e. σ i : Γ i → ∆(C i ), where ∆(C i ) is the probability simplex over C i . When σ i deterministically maps a type to an action, it is called a pure strategy. The Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) of the two-player game is defined as follows.
for all i ∈ {A, B}, all types t i ∈ Γ i occurring with positive probability, and all strategies σ i , where σ −i and T −i denote the strategy and type of the other agent respectively and the expectation is taken over the randomness of agent type T −i and the randomness of the strategies, σ i , σ −i and σ i .
In other words, a strategy profile (σ A , σ B ) is a BNE if both agents maximize their expected utility by playing σ i in responding to the other player's strategy σ −i , i.e. they both play best response.
As mentioned in Section 1.1, our games between A and B belong to the class of signaling games. For signaling games, the terms separating equilibrium and pooling equilibrium are often used to characterize when signaling is fully informative. At a separating equilibrium, a player's strategy allows the other player to deterministically infer her private type, while at a pooling equilibrium multiple types of a player may take the same action, preventing the other player to infer her type with certainty.
Differential Privacy
In order to define differential privacy, we first need to define the notion of neighboring inputs. Inputs are elements in X n for some set X , and two inputs I, I ∈ X n are called neighbors if the two are identical on the details of all individuals (all coordinates) except for at most one.
Definition 2.2 ([DMNS06]
). An algorithm ALG which maps inputs into some range R satisfies -differential privacy if for all pairs of neighboring inputs I, I and for all subsets S ⊂ R it holds that Pr[ALG(I) ∈ S] ≤ e Pr[ALG(I ) ∈ S].
One of the simplest algorithms that achieve -differential privacy is called Randomized Response [KLN + 08, DS10], which dates back to the 60s [War65] . This algorithm is best illustrated over a binary input, where each individual is represented by a single binary bit (therefore a neighboring instance is a neighbor in which one individual is represented by a different bit), Randomized Response works by perturbing the input. For each individual i represented by the bit b i , the algorithm randomly and independently picks a bitb i s.t.
2 for some ∈ [0, 1). It follows from the definition of the algorithm that it satisfies ln(
Randomized Response is sometimes presented as a distributed algorithm, where each individual randomly picksb i locally, and reportsb i publicly. Therefore, it is possible to view this work as an investigation of the type of games in which selfish utility-maximizing agents truthfully follow Randomized Response, rather than sending some arbitrary bit asb i .
In this work, we define certain games and analyze the behavior of the two types of B agent in the BNE of these games. And so, denoting B's strategy as σ B , we consider the implicit algorithm σ B (t) that tells a type-t agent what probability mass to put on the 0-signal and on the 1-signal. Knowing B's strategy σ B , we say that B satisfies ln(X game )-differential privacy where 3
We are interested in finding settings where X game (σ * B ) is finite, where σ * B denotes B's BNE strategy. We say B plays a Randomized Response strategy in a game whenever her BNE strategy σ * B satisfies
2.2.1 Privacy-Aware Agents. depends on) varies between the different works mentioned above, but all works bound the privacy-loss of an agent that interacts with a mechanism that satisfies -differential privacy by u priv B ≤ v · for some v > 0. Here we argue about the behavior of a privacy-aware agent with the maximal privacy loss function, which is the type of agent considered by Ghosh and Roth [GR11] (i.e., the agent's privacy loss when interacting with a mechanism that satisfies -differential privacy is exactly v · for some v > 0).
Recall our toy game: B sends a signalt and gets a coupon of typet. Therefore, the outcome of this simple game ist, precisely the action that B takes. B's type is picked randomly to be 0 w.p. D 0 and 1 w.p. D 1 , and a B agent of type t has valuation of ρ t for a coupon of type t. Therefore, in this game u out B = ρ t 1 [t=t] . The mechanism we consider is σ * B , B's utlity-maximizing strategy, which we think of as the implicit algorithm that tells a type-t agents what probability mass to put on sending thet = 0 signal and what mass to put on thet = 1 signal. As noted above, this strategy satisfies ln(X game )-differential privacy, and so u priv B (σ * B ) = v · ln(X game ) for some parameter v > 0. Assuming D 0 ρ 0 = D 1 ρ 1 , our proof shows that this privacy-aware agent chooses essentially between two alternatives in our toy game: either both types take the same deterministic strategy and send the same signal (Pr 
Note that X game (p, q) ≥ 1, with equality iff p = 1 − q (which means σ B (t) is independent of t and B reveals no information about her type). And so B aims to maximizes the following utility function:
When the strategy that optimizes B's utility, denoted (p * , q * ), satisfies p * = q * = 1/2 + for some ∈ [0, 1 2 ) then we say that B plays using Randomized Response. First, observe that if p + q < 1 then X game > 1 and the utility of B is ) Secondly, observe that the maximum cannot be obtained for (p = 1, q > 0) or (p > 0, q = 1), because in that case X game shoots to infinity, so the privacy loss is infinite. Therefore, if there exist a strategy (p, q) s.t. p > 1 − q and p, q ∈ (0, 1) whose utility is strictly greater than max{D 0 ρ 0 , D 1 ρ 1 }, then it is a utility maximizing strategy. (Otherwise, one of the two strategies (0, 1) or (1, 0) maximizes B's utility.)
Suppose that the maximum is obtained on some (p * , q * ) with p * + q * > 1 and q * > p * . This means that X game = p 1−q > 1. For any (p, q) in a small enough neighborhood of (p * , q * ) we can differentiate u B and it holds that
1−q * , and deduce that in this case the maximal utility is
Hence B is still better off playing either (0, 1) or (1, 0). The case with p * > q * (or equivalently q * (1−q * ) > p * (1−p * )) is symmetric, and so B prefers playing (0, 1) or (1, 0).
It remains to check the case of p * = q * , with p * + q * = 2p * > 1. In this case we have X game = p * 1−p * , and the utility function of B is the univariate function (
, we now use the assumption that ρ 0 , ρ 1 = Ω(ρ 0 + ρ 1 ) and observe that max{D 0 ρ 0 , D 1 ρ 1 } = (1−c)Y for some constant c > 0. Therefore, B prefers playing this randomized strategy if
= 1 then for a large enough value of Y , the above inequality holds.
As an immediate corollary of the proof, consider any alternative definition of a privacy aware agent in which the privacy valuation u priv B (i) depends only on the strategy σ B , is (ii) non-negative, (iii) upper bounded by v ln(X game ) for some v > 0 and (iv) u priv B = ∞ whenever X game = ∞. We argue that the utility maximizing strategy of such an agent is also randomized. (Observe that we no longer guarantee that B's optimal strategy σ * B satisfies Pr[σ * B (0) = 0] = Pr[σ * B (1) = 1].) To see that, observe that whenever p = 1 − q we have that X game = 0 so the privacy loss of an agent is 0. Therefore, playing either (p, q) = (1, 0) or (0, 1), the agent can guarantee a utility of max{D 0 ρ 0 , D 1 ρ 1 }. In contrast, should the agent play any (p, q) with p < 1 − q, then her utility is upper bounded by D 0 p + D 1 q ≤ max{D 0 ρ 0 , D 1 ρ 1 }, because the privacy loss is non-negative. Therefore, the agent prefers playing (p, q) = (1, 0) or (0, 1) to any (p, q) with p < 1 − q. Secondly, since we assume infinite privacy loss whenever X game , then B utility maximizing strategy cannot satisfy that p = 1 and q > 0 (or vice-versa). Lastly, the proof of Theorem 2.3 gives a strategy (p, q) with p > 1 − q where the lower bound on B's utility is greater than max{D 0 ρ 0 , D 1 ρ 1 }. It follows that B strictly prefers playing some strategy (p, q) with p, q ∈ (0, 1) over playing (p, q) = (1, 0) or (p, q) = (0, 1).
The two types of B agent as different players.
The above analysis assumed B is an agent playing this coupon game, decides on a strategy before the realization of her type, and sticks to that strategy even after her type is revealed to her. It is possible though to think of the two types of B agents as two different agents ex-post -after each agent is revealed her own type. As we show, the analysis in this case is slightly different. Observe that in this case we discuss a straight-forward Nash-equilibrium, as both agents know their respective types. In the following, we continue using our notation from earlier, where Pr[σ(i) =t] denotes the probability a B agent of type t = i sends the signalt according to strategy σ.
Theorem 2.4. Consider the 2-player game where player i ∈ {0, 1} is a type t = i B agent. Assume ρ 0 = ρ 1 = ρ and that ρ is sufficiently large. Then there exists some z * ∈ (0, v ρ ) s.t. any NE of the game falls into one of three categories
(Both agents take the same strategy and send the signalt = 0 with high probability 1 − z.)
(Both agents take the same strategy and send the signalt = 1 with high probability 1 − z.)
(Both agents play randomized response and report truthfullyt = t with the same probability z.)
Proof. We continue using the same notation from Theorem 2.3: p = Pr[σ(0) = 0] and q = Pr[σ(1) = 1], and so X game = X game (p, q) as denoted in the proof of Theorem 2.3. In particular, when p + q ≥ 1 it holds that X game (p, q) = p 1−q when p ≤ q, and
First of all, observe that the utilities of both agents are symmetric: u B,0 (p, q) = ρp−v ln(X game (p, q)) and u B,1 (p, q) = ρq − v ln(X game (p, q)). Secondly, observe that if one agent plays determinisitcally Pr[σ(t) =t] = 1 then unless the other type deterministically sends the same signal, then X game (p, q) = ∞ causing both agents to have utility of −∞. It is therefore clear that the strategies (p, q) = (1, 0) and (p, q) = (0, 1) are both NEs.
To find the remaining NEs of the game, we fix a certain strategy for the t = 1 agent, denoted z = Pr[σ(1) = 1], and see what is the strategy x = Pr[σ(0) = 0] that type t = 0 agent prefers deviating to. Since both agents are symmetric, then our analysis also translates to an analysis of type t = 1. Before continuing with our analysis, we point out to the following two functions.
• Fix z and denote f (x) = ρx − v ln( • Fix z and denote g(x) = ρx−v ln( We return on our NE analysis. First, for any z, it is evident that t = 0 agent has incentive to deviate if x < 1 − z. (In response to z, the t = 0 agent increases her utility by deviating to playing
Assume z < 1/2 for now. Therefore x ∈ [1 − z, 1], otherwise the t = 0 agent has incentive to deviate. Since
Since f is strictly decreasing on the interval [1 − v ρ , 1) we have that if 1 − z ≥ 1 − v ρ then the type t = 0 agent has no incentive to deviate when x = 1 − z. I.e., type t = 0 agent does not deviate from any strategy (p, q)
Assume now the case 1/2 ≤ z. Again, we only need to consider
In the former case, the utility of the type t = 0 agent is g(x), and in the latter her utility is f (x). Therefore:
• when z < 1 − v ρ she considers only two possible strategies:
we deduce that in this case, type t = 0 agent does not deviate only from the strategy (1 − v ρ , z).
• when z ≥ 1 − v ρ she considers only two possible strategies:
Recall that the type t = 1 agent is symmetric to type t = 0 agent, with the same utility function. This implies that any (1 − v ρ , q) cannot be a NE since type t = 1 agent prefers to deviate, unless q = 1 − v ρ . Therefore, we essentially characterized the NEs of the game, as specified in the theorem statement.
The Coupon Game with Scoring Rules Payments
In this section, we model the payments between A and B using a proper scoring rule (see below). This model is a good "first-attempt" model for the following two reasons. (i) Proper scoring rules assign profit to A based on the accuracy of her belief, so A has incentives to improve her prior belief on B's type. (ii) As we show, in this model it is possible to quantify the B's trade-off between anchange in the belief and the cost that B pays A. In that aspect, this model gives a clear quantifiable trade-off that explains what each additional unit of -differential privacy buys B. Interestingly, proper scoring rules were recently applied in the context of differential privacy [GLRS14] (yet in a very different capacity).
Proper scoring rules (see surveys [Win96, GR07] ) were devised as a method to elicit experts to report their true prediction about some random variable. For a {0, 1}-valued random variable X, an expert is asked to report a prediction x ∈ [0, 1] about the probability that X = 1. We pay her f 1 (x) if indeed X = 1 and f 0 (x) otherwise. A proper scoring rule is a pair of functions (
. Hence a risk-neutral agent's best strategy is to report x = Pr[X = 1]. Most frequently used proper scoring rules are symmetric (or label-invariant) rules, where ∀x, f 1 (x) = f 0 (1−x) (also referred to as neutral scoring rules in [CDPV14] ). With symmetric proper scoring rules, the payment to an expert reporting x as the probability of a random variable X to be 1, is identical to the payment of an expert reporting (1 − x) as the probability of the random variable (1 − X) to be 1. Additional background regarding proper scoring rules is deferred to Appendix A.
The Game with Scoring Rule Payments
We now describe the game, and analyze its BNE. In this game A interacts with a random B from a population that has D 0 fraction of type 0 agents and D 1 fraction of type 1 agents. Wlog we assume throughout Sections 3, 4 and 5 that D 0 ≥ D 1 . A aims to discover B's secret type. She has utility that is directly linked to her posterior belief on B's type and A reports her belief that B is of type 1. A's payments are given by a proper scoring rule, composed of two functions (f 0 , f 1 ), so that after reporting a belief of x, a B agent of type t pays f t (x) to A.
A benchmark game. First consider the following straight forward (and more boring) game where B does nothing, A merely reports x -her belief that B is of type 1. In this game A gets paid according to a proper scoring rule -i.e., A gets a payment of
is a proper scoring rule, A maximizes her expected payment by reporting The full game. We now turn our attention to a more involved game. Here A, aiming to have a more accurate posterior belief on B's type, offers B a coupon. Agents of type t prefer a coupon of type t. And so, B chooses what type to report A, who then gives B the coupon and afterwards makes a prediction about B's probability of being of type 1. The formal stages of the game are as follows. 1. B reports to A a typet = σ B (t) and receives utility of ρ t if indeedt = t. We assume throughout this section that ρ 0 = ρ 1 = ρ.
B's type, t, is drawn randomly with
2.
A reports a prediction x, representing Pr[t = 1 | σ B (t) =t], and receives a payment from B of f t (x).
Theorem 3.1. Consider the coupon game with payments in the form of a symmetric proper scoring rule and with the following added assumption about the value of the coupon:
The unique BNE strategy of B in this game, denoted σ * B , satisfies that
Note Proof. We first analyze both agents' utilities and strategies. The utility of A is solely based on the payments of the proper scoring rule:
. A has to decide on two potential reports: x 0 and x 1 , where for b ∈ {0, 1}, x b represents A's belief about Pr[t = 1 |t = b]. Therefore, a strategy σ A of A maps a signalt into a report. The utility of B has two components -B gains a certain amount of utility ρ t from reporting A the true type, but then has to pay A her scoring rule payments. Therefore a strategy σ B maps each of B's types to a signal. Given a strategy σ B we use the following notation:
This way, B's utility function takes the form
When A sees the signalt the probability over B's type is given by Bayes Rule:
(1)
and since A's payments come from a proper scoring rule it follows that A reports x 0 = σ A (0) = y 0 and x 1 = σ A (1) = y 1 . In other words, given that B's BNE strategy is (p * , q * ), then A plays best-response of
. We now turn to analyze B's utility. Denote the strategy that A plays as x 0 and x 1 . Then agent B decides on p and q that maximize the utility function
It is simple to characterize B's best response to A's strategy of (x 0 , x 1 ).
We now wish to characterize the game's BNEs. First, we claim that in a BNE, with B playing σ * B = (p * , q * ), it cannot be that p * < 1 − q * . This follows from the fact that y 0 (p, q) > y 1 (p, q) ⇔ p < 1 − q. It means that A's best response to such (p * , q * ) is to answer some (x 0 , x 1 ) s.t. x 0 > x 1 . But since f 0 is a decreasing function, f 1 is an increasing function and ρ > 0, then B's best response to such (x 0 , x 1 ) is to deviate to (1, 1). Similarly, should (p * , q * ) be such that p * = 1 − q * and both p * , q * ∈ (0, 1), then A's best response (x 0 , x 1 ) is (
2 ), which implies again that B prefers to deviate to (1, 1). It follows that, with the exception of (1, 0) and (0, 1), any BNE strategy of B satisfies p * > 1 − q * , and so any BNE strategy of A satisfies x 0 < x 1 .
Before continuing with the proof we would like to make two observations, which we will repeatedly use. Let X be a uniform Bernoulli random variable. We examine the expected payment to an expert reporting a belief of z as to the probability of the event X = 1, which we denote as F 1/2 (z) = 1 2 (f 0 (z) + f 1 (z)). The function F 1/2 is a concave function with a unique maximum at z = 1 2 , and it is strictly increasing on the [0, , 1] interval. Therefore, for any a there exists at most two distinct preimages z 1 ≤ 1 2 ≤ z 2 satisfying F 1/2 (z 1 ) = F 1/2 (z 2 ) = a. Recall that we assume (f 0 , f 1 ) is a symmetric proper scoring rule (so f 1 (z) = f 0 (1 − z) for any z ∈ [0, 1]). So our first observation is: for any z 1 , z 2 satisfying F 1/2 (z 1 ) = F 1/2 (z 2 ) and z 2 > z 1 , we have that z 2 = 1 − z 1 with z 1 ∈ [0, 1/2) and z 2 ∈ (1/2, 1]. Using again the fact that (f 0 , f 1 ) is a symmetry proper scoring rule and the fact that F 1/2 is maximized at z = 1 2 , we make our second observation: for any z, z satisfying
We now return to the proof of the theorem using case analysis as to the potential BNE strategies of B. We will rely also on our assumption that D 0 ≥ D 1 .
• (p * , q * ) = (1, 1), i.e. B always playst = t. This means that A sets x 0 = 0 and x 1 = 1. (I.e.,
A always predicts t = b given the signalt = b.) ( * ) We deduce that if ρ ≥ f 0 (0) − f 0 (1) and ρ ≥ f 1 (1) − f 1 (0), then the game has a BNE of
We comment that since (f 0 , f 1 ) is a symmetric proper scoring rule, then we have that
• (p * , q * ) = (1, 0), i.e. B only sends thet = 0 signal. So when A sees thet = 0 signal she sets x 0 = D 1 just as in the benchmark yet. But A is indifferent as to the choice of x 1 since thê t = 1 signal is never sent. In order for this to be a BNE it must holds that f 1 (
so that both types of B agent would keep sending thet = 0 signal. So 
As f 1 is an increasing function, it must hold that ρ ≤ f 1 (D 0 ) − f 1 (D 1 ). In other words, when ρ > f 1 (D 0 ) − f 1 (D 1 ) then this cannot be a BNE.
• (p * , q * ) = (0, 1). This means that B only sends thet = 1 signal. So now A sets x 1 = D 1 but A is indifferent regarding the value of x 0 . In order for B not to deviate from(0, 1) then
) and our second observation gives that
. This contradicts the fact that f 0 is a strictly decreasing function.
• p * = 1 while q * ∈ (0, 1). This means A sets x 1 = 1 (because only type 1 agents can send t = 1), while setting x 0 = y 0 (p * , q * ) > 0. To keep B from deviating then x 0 should satisfy that
• q * = 1 while p * ∈ (0, 1). This case is symmetric to the previous case, and we get a similar contradiction using F 1/2 (0) ≥ F 1/2 (x 1 ).
• p * , q * ∈ (0, 1) with p * > 1 − q * . We know that A's best response is setting x * 0 = y 0 (p * , q * ) and x * 1 = y 1 (p * , q * ) and we have already shown that y 0 < y 1 . In order for B to play best response against (y 0 , y 1 ) we must have that ρ = f 0 (y 0 )−f 0 (y 1 ) = f 1 (y 1 )−f 1 (y 0 ) so F 1/2 (y 0 ) = F 1/2 (y 1 ). Based on our first observation from before we have that y 1 = 1 − y 0 . In other words, B picks p * and q * s.t. the signalst = 0 andt = 1 are symmetric:
so regardless of the value of b, the expression Pr[t =t |t = b] is the same. Observe that we have
(Recall, (f 0 , f 1 ) are derived using a convex function g as detailed in Section A.1.) In other words, B sets (p * , q * ) by first finding y 1 ∈ ( 1 2 , 1] s.t. g (y 1 ) = ρ, then finding (p * , q * ) that satisfy Equation (5) and yield y 1 . Formally, B finds (p * , q * ) that satisfy
Recall that g is convex and g > 0 on the [0, 1] interval. This implies that as ρ increases, the point y 1 (p * , q * ) gets further away from 1 2 and closer to 1.
Recall that in order for B to play according to Randomized Response, B should set p * = q * . Yet, in this game, a rational agent B plays s.t. A's posterior on B's type is symmetric. Indeed, 1 − y 0 = y 1 implies
and so, unless D 0 = D 1 , we have that p * = q * . Lastly, we comment about A's payment. Using the notation of Equation (10), whent = 0 then A gets an expected payment of F y 0 (y 0 ) = g(y 0
The case with ρ 0 = ρ 1 . We briefly discuss the case where ρ 0 and ρ 1 are not equal. First of all, observe that now there could be situations in which the BNE is of the form (1, q * ) with a nonintegral q * , or the symmetric (p * , 1). This is because the previous contradiction no longer holds. More interestingly the BNE we get: (y 0 , y 1 ) and (p * , q * ) still satifies Equations (1) and (2), and also
which, using ρ 0 ρ 1 can be manipulated into
In otherwords, setting µ = ρ 0 ρ 0 +ρ 1 , we have F µ (y 0 ) = F µ (y 1 ). Alternatively, it is possible to subtract the two equalities and deduce:
These two conditions (along with y 0 < y 1 ) dictate the value of y 0 , y 1 , and thus the values of (p * , q * ). Sadly, it is no longer the case that y 1 = 1 − y 0 .
In Appendix A.2 we discusse the implications of using specific scoring rules.
The Coupon Game with the Identity Payments
In this section, we examine a different variation of our initial game. As always, we assume that B has a type sampled randomly from {0, 1} w.p. D 0 and D 1 respectively, and wlog D 0 ≥ D 1 . Yet this time, the payments between A and B are given in the form of a 2 × 2 matrix we denote as M . This payment matrix specifies the payment from B to A in case A "accuses" B of being of typẽ t ∈ {0, 1} and B is of type t. In general we assume that A strictly gains from finding out B's true type and potentially loses otherwise (or conversely, that a B agent of type t strictly loses utility if A accuses B of being of typet = t and potentially gains money if A accuses B of being of typẽ t = 1 − t). In this section specifically, we consider one simple matrix M -the identity matrix I 2×2 . Thus, A gets utility of 1 from correctly guessing B's type (the same utility regardless of B's type being 0 or 1) and 0 utility if she errs.
The Game and Its Analysis
The benchmark game. The benchmark for this work is therefore a very simple "game" where B does nothing, A guesses a type and B pays A according to M . It is clear that A maximizes utility by guessingt = 0 (since D 0 ≥ D 1 ) and so A gains in expectation D 0 ; where an agent B of type t = 0 pays 1 to A, and an agent B of type t = 1 pays 0 to A.
The full game. Aiming to get a better guess for the actual type of B, we now assume A first offers B a coupon. As before, B gets a utility of ρ t from a coupon of the right type and 0 utility from a coupon of the wrong type. And so, the game takes the following form now. 1. B reports a typet = σ B (t) to A. A in return gives B a coupon of typet.
B's type, denoted t, is chosen randomly, with
2.
A accuses B of being of typet = σ A (t) and B pays 1 to A if indeedt = t.
And so, the utility of agent A is u A = 1 [t=t] . The utility of agent B is a summation of two factors -reporting the true type to get the right coupon and the loss of paying A for finding B's true type. So
Theorem 4.1. In the coupon game with payments given by the identity matrix with ρ 0 = ρ 1 , any BNE strategy of B is pure for at least one of the two types of B agent. Formally, for any BNE strategy of B, denoted σ * B , there exist t,t ∈ {0, 1} s.t. Pr[σ * B (t) =t] = 1. In the case where ρ 0 = ρ 1 then B has infinitely many randomized BNE strategies, including a BNE strategy σ * B s.t.
Proof. First, we denote the strategies of agents A and B. We denote Using these 4 parameters,we analyze the utility functions of the agents of the game. We start with the utility function of A: 
These are A's "lines of indifference": when B plays (p, q) ∈ 1 then A is indifferent to any value of x in the range [0, 1], and when B plays (p, q) ∈ 2 then A is indifferent between any value of y.
Observe that 1 and 2 have the same slope, and so they are parallel, and that the point (p, q) = (1, 0) is above 1 yet on 2 . It follows that 2 is above 1 (unless D 0 = D 1 = 1 2 in which case the two lines coincide). The two lines are shown in Figure 2 .
We now turn our attention to the utility functions of B. The utility of B of type t = 0 is
and the utility of B of type t = 1 is
which means that B's best response strategies are: If max{ρ 0 , ρ 1 } > 1: then at least one coupon have value strictly greater than 1 and so one of the two types of B agents strictly prefers deviating to playing deterministically. Wlog this type is the t = 0 type, and so in any BNE of the game we have that Pr[σ * B (0) = 0] = 1. The interesting case is when max{ρ 0 , ρ 1 } ≤ 1 and since we assume ρ 0 = ρ 1 then for some type of B agent the value of the coupon is strictly < 1. (This intuitively makes sense -the coupon game becomes interesting only when B's value for the coupon is below the max-payment from B to A, hence B has incentive to hide her true type.)
We continue with a case analysis as to the potential BNE strategies of B.
• Strictly above the 2 line, where
, and as a result
Therefore, given that A observes any signalt ∈ {0, 1} it is more likely that a B agent of typet sent that this signal. So A responds to such strategy by playing deterministically Pr[σ * A (t) =t] = 1 for any signalt ∈ {0, 1}. As A prefers to play x = y = 1 and some type of B agent has coupon valuation < 1 then that type deviates (so either p = 0 or q = 0), and so the BNE strategy of B cannot be above the 2 line.
• Strictly below the 2 line, where
This means B plays s.t.
. So thet = 1 signal is more likely to come from a t = 0 type agent, and so A's best response is to set (1−y) = Pr[σ * A (1) = 0] = 1. We thus have that x + y − 1 ≤ 0 whereas ρ 0 , ρ 1 > 0. Hence B deviates to playing (p, q) = (1, 1), and so the BNE of B cannot be below the 2 line.
• On the 2 line, where
This means B plays s.t. will be discussed later). And so when A views thet = 0 signal it is more likely that the type of B agent is t = 0 so x = Pr[σ * A (0) = 0] = 1; whereas when A views thet = 1 signal both types of B agents are as likely to send the signal, so A is indifferent as to the value of y = Pr[σ * A (1) = 1]. Since ρ 0 = ρ 1 , then by setting the single parameter y, A can makes at most one of the two types of B agent indifferent, while the other type plays a pure strategy. In other words, B's BNE strategy can only be one of the two extreme point: (p, q) = (1, 0) or (p, q) = (
, 1). The pure strategy of the non-indifferent type is determined by the relation between ρ 0 ≷ ρ 1 . So the possible BNEs are:
In the special case where D 0 = D 1 (the two lines are the same one) then (p = 1, q = 0) and (p = 0, q = 1) are both BNE regardless with A BNE strategy being any (x, y) satisfying with min{ρ 0 , ρ 1 } ≤ x + y − 1 ≤ max{ρ 0 , ρ 1 }.
Observe that in the case with ρ 0 = ρ 1 < 1, in a BNE, B may play any strategy on the 2 -line and A makes both types of B agent indifferent to the value of p, q by setting y = ρ 0 = ρ 2 ). We comment that if B plays the strategy (1, 0), then this last statement is vacuous since thet = 1 signal is never sent.
Observe, when B plays any strategy on the 2 line, the utility that A gets from using the Nashstrategy of (1, y) is D 0 p + D 0 (1 − p) = D 0 . In other words, moving from the benchmark game to this more complicated coupon game gives A no additional revenue. In fact, the only agent that gains anything is B. In the benchmark game B's utility is −D 0 . In the coupon game, B's utility is
Continuous Coupon Valuations
We now consider the same game with the same payments, but under a different setting. Whereas before we assumed the valuations that the two types of B agents have for the coupon are fixed (and known in advance), we now assume they are not fixed. In this section we assume the existence of a continuous prior over ρ, where each type t ∈ {0, 1} has its own prior, so
with an analogous definition of CDF 1 (x). We use CDF B to denote the cumulative distribution function of the prior over ρ (i.e., CDF B (x) = Pr[ρ < x] = D 0 CDF 0 (x) + D 1 CDF 1 (x)). We assume the CDF is continuous and so Pr[ρ = y] = 0 for any y. Given any z ≥ 0 we denote CDF • Agent A always playst = 0 after viewing thet = 0 signal (i.e., Pr[σ * A (0) = 0] = 1); and plays t = 1 after viewing thet = 1 signal with probability y * (i.e., Pr[σ * A (1) = 1] = y * ), where y * is any value in CDF • Agent B reports truthfully (sends the signalt = t) whenever her valuation for the coupon is greater than y * , and lies (sends the signalt = 1 − t) otherwise. That is, for every t ∈ {0, 1} and ρ ∈ [0, ∞), we have that if ρ > y * then Pr The utility function of B remains the same:
So B's best response to any strategy of (x, y) of A is given by
We call such a strategy a threshold strategy characterized by a parameter T , where any agent whose ρ < T playst = 1 − t and any agent with ρ > T playst = t. 4 Clearly, in any BNE, B follows a threshold strategy for some value of T . Therefore, since A's BNE strategy is best response to B's BNE strategy, it suffices to consider A's best response against a threshold strategy. Given that B follows a threshold strategy with threshold T we have that A's utility function is
where we use the notation CDF B = D 0 CDF 0 + D 1 CDF 1 . As A maximizes her strategy, we have that A sets x > 0 only if
we only have three cases to consider.
• If CDF B (T ) < D 1 : In this case A's best response is to set x = y = 1 and B's best-response to (1, 1) is to set the threshold parameter T = x + y − 1 = 1. (So every B agent with ρ < 1 determinisitically sends the signalt = 1 − t and any B agent with ρ > 1 sends the signal t = t.) Clearly, if it holds that CDF B (1) < D 1 , i.e., that the probability of a random B agent to have ρ ≤ 1 is less than D 1 , then we have a BNE.
• If CDF B (T ) > D 1 : In this case A's best response sets y = 0 and x ∈ [0, 1]. As B is playing best response to A's strategy then it means that the threshold parameter is set to T = x − 1 ≤ 0.
(And so all B agents have coupon valuation ρ > 0 we have that all B agents determinisitically send the signalt = t.) But for such T we have that CDF B (T ) ≤ CDF B (0) = 0 < D 1 we get an immediate contradiction.
• If CDF B (T ) = D 1 : In this case A sets x = 1 and is indifferent to the choice of y. Observe that B's best response to A's strategy of (1, y) is to set the threshold parameter to T = y. We have that this is indeed a BNE if y ∈ CDF B (D 1 ) is A's BNE strategy, and B's BNE strategy is a threshold strategy with the threshold parameter set to T = y * . We comment that in the case where D 0 = D 1 and A is indifferent to the choice of x as well, the BNE strategy of A is defined using any x * , y * ∈ [0, 1] that satisfy x * + y * ∈ CDF −1 B (D 1 ). 4 Since ρ is sampled from a continuous distribution, then the probability of the event ρ = T is 0.
Observe that in this game, from A perspective, without knowing the realized value of ρ, it appears that B is playing a randomized strategy. Furthermore, should the coupon valuation and the type be chosen independently (i.e. PDF 0 = PDF 1 ) then A views B's strategy as Randomized Response -since for a randomly chosen ρ it holds that Pr[σ(ρ, 0) = 0] = Pr[σ B (ρ, 1) = 1]. In that case the behavior of B preserves -differential privacy for
The Coupon Game with an Opt Out Strategy
In this section, we consider a version of the game considered in Section 4. The revised version of the game we consider here is very similar to the original game, except for A's ability to "opt out" and not guess B's type. In this section, we consider the most general form of matrix payments. We replace the identitymatrix payments with general payment matrix M of the form
with the (i, j) entry in M means A guessedt = i and B's true type is t = j, and so B pays A the amount detailed in the (i, j)-entry. We assume M 0,0 , M 0,1 , M 1,0 , M 1,1 are all non-negative. Indeed, when previously considering the identity matrix payments, we assumed the for A, realizing that B has type t = 0 is worth just as much as finding B has type t = 1. But it might be the case that finding a person of t = 1 should be more worthwhile for A. For example, type t = 1 (the minority, since we always assume D 0 ≥ D 1 ) may represent having some embarrassing medical condition while type t = 0 representing not having it. Therefore, M 1,1 can be much larger than M 0,0 , but similarly M 1,0 is probably larger than M 0,1 . (Falsely accusing B of being of the embarrassing type is costlier than falsely accusing a B of type 1 of belonging to the non-embarrassing majority.) Our new payment matrix still motivates A to find out B's true type -A gains utility by correctly guessing B's type, and loses utility by accusing B of being of the wrong type.
The "strawman" game. First, consider a simple game where B makes no move (A offers no coupon) and A tries to guess B's type without getting any signal from B. Then A has three possible pure strategies: (i) guess that B is of type 0; (ii) guess that B is of type 1; and (iii) guess nothing. In expectation, the outcome of option (i) is
. If the parameters of M are set such that both options are negative then A's preferred strategy is to opt out and gain 0. We assume throughout this section that indeed the above holds. (Intuitively, this assumption reflects the fact that we don't make assumptions about people's type without first getting any information about them.) So we have
A direct (and repeatedly used) corollary of Equation (6) is that
The full game. We now give the formal description of the game. 1. B reports a typet to A. A in return gives B a coupon of typet.
2.
A chooses whether to accuse B of being of a certain type, or opting out.
• If A opts out (denoted ast = ⊥), then B pays A nothing.
• If A accuses B of being of typet then: ift = t then B pays M t,t to A, and ift = 1 − t then B pays −M 1−t,t to A (or A pays M 1−t,t to B).
Introducing the option to opt out indeed changes significantly the BNE strategies of A and B.
Case Condition A's Strategy B's strategy No.
(always: The various conditions under which we characterize the BNEs of the Game.
We use the notation P 2 = (1 − The point P 5 lies at the intersection between two specific lines, and points P 2 and P 4 are the intersection points of each of those lines with the (q = 1)-line and (p = 1)-line resp. In case 6, the strategy of A is given by
and the parameters of the game satisfy the following condition:
then the unique BNE strategy of B, denote σ * B , is such that B plays Randomized Response:
Proving Theorem 5.1 is the goal of this section. The proof itself is deferred to the next section. We give here, in Table 1 a summary of the various BNEs of this game. The six cases detailed in Table 1 cover all possible settings of the game and they are also mutually exclusive (unless some inequality holds as an equality). The notation in Table 1 is consistent with our notation in the analysis of the game. A strategy σ B of agent B is denoted as (p, q) and a strategy σ A of agent A is denoted as (x 0 , x 1 , y 0 , y 1 ). Formally, we denote p = Pr[σ B (0) = 0] and q = Pr[σ B (1) = 1]; and
The various conditions given in Table 1 are feasibility conditions. They guarantee that A is able to find a strategy (x 0 , x 1 , y 0 , y 1 ) ∈ [0, 1] 4 that cause at least one of the two types of B agent to be indifferent as to the signal she sends. Case 6, which is the case relevant to Theorem 5.1, can be realized starting with any matrix M satisfying M 0,0 M 1,1 < M 0,1 M 1,0 (which is a necessary condition derived from Equation (6)), which intuitively can be interpreted as having a wrong "accusation" being costlier than the gain from a correct "accusation" (on average and in absolute terms). Given such M , one can set D 0 and D 1 s.t.
as to satisfy Equation (6). This can be interpreted as balancing the "significance" of type 0 (i.e. M 0,0 M 0,1 ) with the "significance" of type 1 (i.e. M 1,0 M 1,1 ), setting the more significant type as the less probable (i.e. if type 1 is more significant than type 0, than D 1 < D 0 ). We then pick ρ 0 , ρ 1 that satisfy
and scale both by the sufficiently small multiplicative factor so we satisfy the other inequality of case 6. (In particular, setting
is a feasible solution.) Here, ρ 0 and ρ 1 are set such that the ratio
) and satisfy the requirements of Theorem 5.1. Recall, in addition to the conditions specifically stated in Case 6 in Table 1 , we also require that
in order for the two types of agent B to play Randomized Response. In other words, this condition implies that B's BNE strategy, represented by the point
lies on the p = q line. And so, in this case the B agent plays a Randomized Response strategy that preserves -differential privacy for = ln(
. Observe that this value of is independent from the value of the coupon (i.e., from ρ 0 and ρ 1 ). This is due to the nature of BNE in which an agent plays her Nash-strategy in order to make her opponent indifferent between various strategies rather than maximizing her own utility. Therefore, the coordinates of P 5 are such that they make agent A indifferent between opting out and playing x 0 = 1 (or opting out and y 1 = 1). Since the utility function of A is independent of ρ 0 , ρ 1 , we have that perturbing the values of ρ 0 , ρ 1 does not affect the coordinates of P 5 . (Yet, perturbing the values of ρ 0 , ρ 1 does affect the various relations between the parameters of the game, and so it may determine which of the 6 cases in Table 1 . In contrast to the previous analysis, now A has to decide between 3 alternatives pert signal, so A has 6 options. However, seeing as A's choice to opt-out always give A a utility of 0, we just denote 4 alternatives:
and we constrain x 0 + x 1 ≤ 1 and y 0 + y 1 ≤ 1. 5 Now, given that A views a signalt, she has 3 alternatives:
• Accuse B of being of type 0 and get an expected revenue of
• Accuse B of being of type 1 and get an expected revenue of
• Opt out and get revenue of 0 =
. This means that A prefers accusing B of being of type 0 to opting out when
Similarly, A prefers accusing B of being of type 1 to opting out when
From Equation (6) we have that
. Therefore, given that Pr[t] > 0, then A's best response is determined by the ratio:
A is indifferent between ⊥ and playingt = 1
A is indifferent between ⊥ and playingt = 0
Therefore A's BNE strategy when viewing the signalt (which is best response to B's BNE strategy) is such that A never plays botht =t andt = 1 −t with non-zero probability. Switching to the B agent, the utility functions of B are similar to before:
We can now make our first claim about the BNE of the game.
Claim 5.2. In any BNE strategy of B we have that either
Proof. Assume for the same of contradiction that both conditions do not hold. Then given thê t = 0 signal it holds that x 0 = Pr[σ * A (0) = 0] = 0, and given thet = 1 signal it holds that y 1 = Pr[σ * A (1) = 1] = 0. Thus, B's best response to A's strategy is to switch to (p, q) = (1, 1) (since ρ 0 , ρ 1 > 0) and now both conditions do hold.
Claim 5.3. In any BNE strategy of B we have that both
Proof. Based on the previous claim, one of the two inequalities is immediate. Assume we have
, we now show that
we have that
which contradicts Equation (6). The argument for the case We are now able to prove the existence of a BNE as specified Theorem 5.1.
The strategies σ * A and σ * B denoted below are BNE strategies. Figure 3) .
First, we argue that any (p, q) in the lower region, below l 1 and l 2 (the shaded blue region in Figure 3 ) cannot be B's strategy in a BNE. We in fact already shown this: for any (p, q) in this blue region we have that
, contradicting our earlier claim. Secondly, we argue that a point (p, q) above both lines is B's strategy in a BNE is if the valuation of B for the coupons is high. Observe, for any (p, q) above the line, A's best response is to set x 0 = y 1 = 1, which means B's utility is p(ρ 0 − M 0,0 ) + (1 − p)M 1,0 for agents of type t = 0, and q(ρ 1 − M 1,1 ) + (1 − q)M 0,1 for type t = 1. Therefore, B has no incentive to deviate from (p, q) only if ρ 0 ≥ M 0,0 + M 1,0 and ρ 1 ≥ M 0,1 + M 1,1 . In particular, when both inequalities are strict, we have that (1, 1) is B's BNE; when both are equalities, any point above both l 1 and l 2 is a BNE; and when one is an equality and the other is a strict inequality, we have that the BNE strategy is on the border of the [0, 1] × [0, 1] square.
We now turn our attention to the points strictly between the lines l 1 and l 2 (excluding all points on these lines). To any (p, q) in these regions, A's best response is to playt =t when seeing one signal and to opt-out when seeing the other signal. E.g., for any (p, q) above l 1 but below l 2 (the top-left region), A opts out when seeing thet = 1 signal, but playt = 0 when seeing thet = 0 signal. In that case, B's utility function is p(ρ 0 − M 0,0 ) for type t = 0, and qρ 1 + (1 − q)M 0,1 for type t = 1. Therefore, unless ρ 0 = M 0,0 , agents of type t = 0 have incentive to deviate (either to playing p = 0 or p = 1). In addition, it must also hold that ρ 1 ≥ M 0,1 . (If this inequality is strict, then the BNE strategy lies on the border of the square.) Analogously, should the BNE strategy lie above the l 2 line but below the l 1 line (lower-right area), then it must be the case that ρ 1 = M 1,1 and ρ 0 ≥ M 1,0 .
We now consider points on the l 1 and l 2 , excluding the 5 intersection points we have with either the two lines, or any of the lines intersection with the p = 1 line or the q = 1 line.
• For any (p, q) on the l 1 line below the l 2 line (top-left side of l 1 bordering the blue region):
A's best response to any such (p, q) is to set y 0 = y 1 = 0 and x 1 = 0. It follows that B's utility is p(ρ 0 − x 0 M 0,0 ) and qρ 1 + (1 − q)x 0 M 0,1 for types t = 0 and t = 1 resp. Hence, if 0 ≤
≤ 1 then such strategies can be BNE
• For any (p, q) on the l 1 line above the l 2 line (bottom-right side of l 1 bordering the red region): A's best response to such (p, q) is to set x 1 = y 0 = 0, y 1 = 1; B's utility functions are p(ρ 0 − x 0 M 0,0 ) + (1 − p)M 1,0 and q(ρ 1 − M 1,1 ) + (1 − q)x 0 M 0,1 for types t = 0 and t = 1 resp. It follows that if 0
≤ 1, then such point give a BNE
• For any (p, q) on the l 2 line below the l 1 line (bottom-right side of l 2 bordering the blue region): As a response to any (p, q) here, A sets x 0 = x 1 = 0 and y 0 = 0. B's utility function is therefore pρ 0 + (1 − p)(y 1 M 1,0 ) and q(ρ 1 − y 1 M 1,1 ). Hence, in case 0
≤ 1, we have a BNE with such (p, q).
• For any (p, q) on the l 2 line above the l 1 line (top-left side of l 2 bordering the red region):
As best response to such (p, q), A sets x 1 = y 0 = 1 and x 0 = 1. And so B's utility functions are
≤ 1 then we have a BNE with such (p, q).
Thus far (with the exception of the potential BNE at the point (p, q) = (1, 1)) we have considered only BNE that may arise only when the parameters of the game (ρ 0 , ρ 1 and the entries of M ) satisfy some equality constraints. Assuming we perturb the values of ρ 0 and ρ 1 a little such that none of the above-mentioned equalities hold, we are left with 5 points on which the BNE can occur:
We traverse them one by one. We remind the reader that since
We repeatedly use this inequality in the analysis below.
5.2.1 Conditions under which B's BNE strategy is P 1 .
Observe that in this case B never sends thet = 0 signal. A's best response in naturally to opt-out, but A still commits to a certain values of x 0 and x 1 (to prevent B from deviating from the (0, 1) strategy). B's utility functions are
For t = 1 :
Therefore, in order for B to not have any incentive to deviate, A should set y 0 , y 1 s.
Proposition 5.9. There exist y 0 , y 1 ∈ [0, 1] satisfying both ρ 0 ≥ −y 0 M 0,0 + y 1 M 1,0 and
The proof is completely analogous to the proof of Proposition 5.6.
5.2.4
Conditions under which B's BNE strategy is P 4 .
As a response to this strategy, A's best response is to set x 1 = y 0 = 0 and y 1 = 1, while x 0 is to be determined. So B's utility functions are
Therefore, in order for B to not have any incentive to deviate, A should set x 0 s.
The proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition 5.7.
5.2.5
Conditions under which B's BNE strategy is P 5 .
As this point lies on the intersection of l 1 and l 2 , then A's best response to this strategy is to set x 1 = y 0 = 0. Thus,B's utility functions are
It is therefore up to A to pick x 0 and y 1 that satisfy both equalities
x 0 y 1 Cramer's formula give that the solution to this system is
In order for x 0 , y 1 to be in the range [0, 1], we therefore must have that:
In other words:
5.2.6 Summarizing. Table 1 span all potential values the parameters of the game may take, and furthermore (modulo cases of equality between parameters) they are also mutually exclusive.
Lemma 5.11. Assume that the parameters of the game (i.e. ρ 0 , ρ 1 and the entries of M ) satisfy one of the 6 conditions detailed in Table 1 with strict inequalities. Then no other condition in Table 1 holds simultaneously. In other words, the conditions in Table 1 are mutually exclusive (excluding equalities). As the conditions are mutually exclusive it means that under the condition specified in Theorem 5.5, the game has a unique BNE -as specified by case 6 in Table 1 .
Conclusions and Future Directions
Our work is a first attempt at exposing and reconciling the competing conclusions of two different approaches to the same challenge: the theory of privacy-aware agents (where privacy loss is modeled using differential privacy), and the behavior of standard utility-maximizing agents once they explicitly assess future losses from having their behavior in the current game publicly exposed. While the canonical privacy-aware agent randomizes her strategy, we show that different explicit privacy losses cause very different behavior among agents. This is best illustrated with the game studied in Section 4 (Theorem 4.2). In that game, agents assess their future loss and their behavior is therefore quite simple: if the current gain is greater than the future loss, their behavior is to truthfully report their type; otherwise they lie and report the opposite type. We believe this simple rule explains real-life phenomena, such as people trying to hide their medical condition from the general public while truthfully answering a doctor's questions. 6 Observe however that in all the games we analyzed, we still have not pinned down a game in which the behavior of a non-privacy aware agent fully mimics the behavior of a privacy-aware agent. Privacy-aware agents' behavior is, after a fashion, quite reasonable. They trade-off between the value of the coupon they get and the amount of privacy (or change in belief) they are willing to risk. Naturally, the higher the value of the coupon, the more privacy they are willing to risk. In contrast, in the game discussed in Section 5, even under settings where B's BNE strategy σ * B is randomized and satisfies Pr[σ * B (0)] = Pr[σ * B (1)], we don't see a continuous change in B's behavior based on the value of the coupon. Changing solely the value of the coupon while keeping all other parameters the same, we see that B plays the same BNE strategy, whereas A's BNE strategy continuously changes.
It would be interesting to pursue this line of work further, by studying more complex games. In particular, we propose the following scenario, which resembles the standard narrative in differentialprivacy literature and should provide a complementary approach to the "sensitive surveyor" problem [GR11, NOS12, RS12, NVX14, GLRS14]. Suppose that the signal that B sends is not for a type of coupon that gives B an immediate and fixed reward, but rather a response of B to a survey question. That is, suppose B interacts with a benevolent data curator that wishes to learn the distribution of type-0 and type-1 agents in the population and B may benefit from the effect of curator's analysis. (For example, the data curator may ask people with a certain disease about their exposure to some substance.) In such a case, B's utility is a function of the curator's ability to well approximate the true answer. In addition to the potential gain, there is also potential loss, based on B's concerns about her private information being publicly exposed. What formulation of this privacy loss results in B playing according to a Randomized Response strategy? What explicit formulation of privacy loss causes B to truthfully report her type knowing that A's will data be published using an -differential private mechanism?
Most commonly discussed proper scoring rules are symmetric (or label-invariant) proper scoring rules, that are oblivious to that outcomes of X (also referred to as neutral scoring rules in [CDPV14] ). That is, symmetric scoring rules have the property that for any two Bernoulli random variables X and X s.t. Pr[X = 1] = Pr[X = 0] the expected payment for an expert predicting x for X is identical to the payment for an expert predicting 1−x for X . Such symmetric scoring rules are derived from a convex function g that is symmetric around 1 2 . I.e.: g(x) = g(1−x), and so g (x) = −g (1 − x) and g (x) = g (1 − x).
Concrete examples of proper scoring rules, such as the quadratic scoring rule, the spherical scoring rule and the logarithmic scoring rules, are discussed in Section A.2.
A.2 Strategies Under Specific Scoring Rules
We now plug-in different types of proper and symmetric scoring rules, and find what p * and q * are in each case. We analyze the game for a value of ρ s.t. the BNE is obtained where neither p * nor q * are integral. We also characterize what is the in A's posterior probability -the value of max b ln
. There exists 3 canonical rules often used in literature: Quadratic, Spherical and Logarithmic.
Quadratic Scoring Rule. The quadratic scoring rule is defined by the functions (f 0 (x), f 1 (x)) = (2 − 2x 2 , 4x − 2x 2 ). The quadratic scoring rule is generated by the convex function g(x) = x 2 + (1 − x) 2 + 1 = 2 − 2x + 2x 2 . (So, g (x) = −2 + 4x and g (x) = −2.) Therefore (f 0 (x), f 1 (x)) = (−4x, 4(1 − x)).
Observe that since g ∈ [−2, 2], Equation (4) gives that ρ ∈ [−2, 2] as well. Hence, Equation (4) takes the form
So we have 
and this is because we assume D 0 p > D 1 (1 − q) and D 1 q > D 0 (1 − p). (That is, when we see the signalt = 0 it is more likely to come from a t = 0-type agent than a t = 1-agent, and similarly with thet = 1 signal.)
After arithmetic manipulations, we have
using the fact that ρ ≤ 1 and that D 0 p > D 1 (1 − q) and D 1 q > D 0 (1 − p), then
(because 1 − ρ 2 − ρ 2 ≤ 1 − ρ ≤ 1 − ρ 2 .) We have that 
Logarithmic Scoring Rule. The logarithmic scoring rule is defined by the functions (f 0 (x), f 1 (x)) = (ln(1 − x), ln(x)) which are generated by g(x) = −H(x) = x ln(x) + (1 − x) ln(1 − x). 
